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It is well established that the European Union (hereinafter “EU”) is bound to respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “Convention”) and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.​[1]​ Although the original purpose of human rights protection in Europe was to protect rights of individuals from their infringement by Member States (vertical effect), it has nowadays been more or less acknowledged by both the ECJ and national courts that human rights and fundamental freedoms are also applicable to litigations between private individuals (horizontal effect).​[2]​ 

In fact, this is far from the end of the story. Indeed, the answer to whether private actors are bound by fundamental rights found in their national constitutions or supra-national conventions and treaties directly, or experience just an indirect “interpretative” impact (or even both?) is not so straightforward. Currently, the issue is one of the most important and hotly debated in comparative constitutional law. What matters is a practical impact (if any) of the direct versus indirect horizontal doctrine on the case law developed by the courts of different Member States. Would a judge in a “direct horizontal” country dismiss the claim which has not been dismissed by his European colleague just because the latter accepts some forms of indirect horizontality of fundamental rights in the private law? Putting the issue into our context, why should the human right of freedom of expression​[3]​ be accepted as a legitimate excuse for infringing with the landowner’s rights in Italy whereas refused to be accepted in the United Kingdom? Does that mean that European citizens of one state do enjoy in fact a higher standard of protection of their expressive freedom than do the others?​[4]​











Under traditional rules of property law, access to land is granted at the discretion of the landowner. All property owners (whether state or private ones)​[5]​ are thus said to be entitled to exclude anyone from their property. The landowner enjoys an absolute power to determine – no matter how arbitrarily or selectively – who may (may not) enter or remain on his or her land. The landowner has simply an uncontrolled discretion to exclude any person from entering his or her private land according to ‘every invasion of land, be it ever so minute, is a trespass’ notion.​[6]​  No doctrine of reasonable access or natural (distributive) justice controls the selective power to grant the access to property. In the absence of some overriding statutory or common law restraints, the private property owner seems to enjoy an absolute and indisputable discretion to withhold or withdraw permission to enter.​[7]​ As the English would say: My home is my castle!​[8]​






2. National viewpoints from the European Union

	
During the last 30 years a much bigger social as well as legal importance has been attached to the values which underlie various claims of fundamental and human rights in Europe.​[9]​ The recent realisation that property rights and personal rights are interlinked and that the scope of an owner’s rights even in such resources as land needs to be limited by evidently more important public interests has become the main source of inspiration for many European courts for redefining the scope of public rights of non-owners over other people’s land in order to delineate the powers of landowners accordingly, partly by reference to general statements of social interests and human rights.​[10]​ 

Indeed, the following general considerations about a current situation in the EU can be made in this context: 


1.	Generally, it seems that the horizontal effect (direct or indirect) of the fundamental human right to freedom of expression has already been recognized by some Member States as a shield (or even a sword) against otherwise unchallengeable claim of property rights of the owner helping to establish a fair balance between strong powers of landowners and a human right highly valued in democratic societies (Italy, Spain and Sweden acknowledged a direct horizontal effect of claimed human right whereas German courts sticked to their Drittwirkung doctrine). 


2.	Though recognizing the crucial instrumental role that expressive activity can play within a democracy, English judges seem to favour property rights even in situations which can clearly be distinguishable from ”my home is my castle” type of situation. 

3.	Lastly, although virtually every major jurisdiction throughout the EU has already had experience of some kind of hotly contested mall litigation, there are still some Member States, which have not. Here, therefore, only a hypothetical answer to what the result of such litigation in these countries would be can be given (France, Poland, Portugal and The Netherlands). 


Ad 1) Sweden, Italy, Spain and Germany 


In a very first direct horizontal case where a court dealt with the assertion of freedom of press against the proprietary claim of a company who organized a horse competition in a private sport stadium was found in Sweden.​[11]​ The facts of case read as follows:  

A private company specialising in training the horses organized a horse race in a sport stadium. The race was open to public and people were widely invited to come, buy a ticket and enjoy the racing. However, when the publishers of a horse magazine wanted to stay in the stadium in order to sell the new issue of the magazine that contained a programme of the race rather than just passively watch the competition, the main organisators of the race prevented them from doing so. They indicated that the publishers could enter the stadium and sell their magazine only on the condition that they would change some information in their magazine according to organisators’ needs. Having refused to do so, the publishers decided to sell their magazine near the stadium’s entrance (already a public place). Again, they were stopped by the same organisators who after a while came and ordered them to leave the place. The publishers therefore claimed in the court that their right to sell the magazine in a public place (near the entrance of the stadium) as a part of a freedom of press right was infringed. Having considered the relevant national legislation,​[12]​ a Swedish court held that it was unlawful to deny access to the stadium to people who entered it lawfully. The court continued by holding that the publishers did not infringe stadium-owner’s rights simply because they started selling the magazine near the entrance of the stadium. Although the Swedish case is not a classic type of mall litigation, from what the court said about public-like (quasi-public) places already 35 years ago is assumable that Swedish courts would look for a proper balance between claims of private property and assertion of freedom of expression as a fundamental human right if such a case arose. 

Even more explicit was the decision of a court in Italy.​[13]​ For the safety’s sake, the security employed by the commercial centre did not allow a few allies of a candidate for the European elections to distribute political flyers in a commercial centre a few days before the election date. Balancing the right to access to information, right to freedom of thought​[14]​ and political rights​[15]​ on the one hand, with the right to private property on the other, the Italian court finally relied on the regola di prevalenza (a prevailing rule) and held that a right to distribute political flyers in a personal, non-invasive way​[16]​ in a place which although privately owned fulfils mainly (if not solely) public functions (unless causing inconvenience to other commercial activities that do take place there or infringing a basic content of property rights) undoubtedly prevails. In this case, the right to distribute and receive information, ie freedom of expression in a public accessible property was clearly held as privileged by the Italian judges.

Spanish courts made it likewise clear that the right of a person seeking to inform others about public issues of political or social nature (unless they are confidential) includes freely to seek, process information as well as to distribute it.​[17]​ As a result, given the newly adopted – as it then was - Ley 21/1997, de 3 de Julio, reguladora de las emisiones y retransmisiones de competiciones y acontecimientos deportivos (Act 21/1997 on the Emission and Broadcasting of Competitions and Sports Events), popularly known as the Ley del Fútbol, a Spanish broadcasting company was held to be entitled to enter football stadium and to shoot and broadcast the football matches whereas managers of the first and the second football league were not entitled to prevent the company from exercising its right to receive and latterly to distribute information about the sport event.​[18]​     

Though not direct, nevertheless horizontal effect of freedom of expression in private litigations was undoubtedly recognized in Germany. Here, a very deep sensitivity has been shown towards the social limitations of ownership. Indeed so pervasive is the German concern with the dignity of the individual​[19]​ that the property provisions of the Grundgesetz (German Constitution)​[20]​ are said to provide not primarily a material but rather a personal guarantee. On this analysis, property is an elementary constitutional right which is closely related to the guarantee of personal liberty.​[21]​ 

The degree of socialization of private property reaches a very high level especially when the property owner – or whoever exercises his authority for him – through publicity and design of the surroundings suggests public access to his/her property. Such is the case of shopping centres, which due to the high number of individual business people conveys the idea of a modern market place. Since the market and streets were the traditional means of communication for an exchange of personal gossip as well as for a political and economic discussion, neither the function of private freedoms nor the public discussion of political and economic issues should be jeopardised.​[22]​ Just as it was impossible to keep dishonourable citizens away from the market, someone who had been previously caught shoplifting in one shop cannot be forbidden from entering the whole shopping centre.​[23]​ 

While interpreting the private law, German courts clearly take into account a normative content of fundamental rights in order to reach a proper balance of rights at stake.​[24]​ Thus, German judges will clearly recognize your right to distribute flyers or to sell newspapers in order to inform public about political or economic issues on local roads or in town squares.​[25]​ Putting up posters of political parties on the town’s streets is likewise entirely lawful and cannot be conditioned upon the local authority’s permission that goes beyond its legitimate discretionary power.​[26]​ In the horizontal context, political groups and consumer organisations, which follow general or specific concerns, are also free to distribute information and political flyers as well as to set information stalls in privately owned commercial centres or malls.​[27]​ 


Ad 2) The United Kingdom


A classic example of an English approach to a tension between property and expressive rights represents a court’s decision in CIN Properties Ltd v Rawlins and others.​[28]​ In the 1990s, the Swansgate Shopping Centre (hereinafter “the Centre”) was frequently visited by a small group of local residents of whom the majority was unemployed black youths. Allegedly, the private security employed by the Centre got from time to time into arguments with youths and tried to arrest them for meaningless defaults such as whistling in public. Indeed, these young people were said to have a provocative behaviour. It is nevertheless undoubted that following one incident in the Centre, 10 of the youths were charged with public order offences. Claiming that the youths had been frequently guilty of nuisance at the premises, the owner of a shopping mall (CIN Properties Ltd) imposed an open-ended ban upon further entry by the group and intended to get an injunction in further legal proceedings. Two weeks after the unsuccessful criminal trial the landowner nevertheless applied for injunctive relief to reinforce the privately imposed ban on entry.

The county court, however, ruled that members of the public had an equitable licence to enter, but that the licence was revocable for good reason. Invoking the subjectively perceived threat of crime or other disturbance by youths, the owners had appealed. The English Court of Appeal overturned a county court ruling that the members of the public, subject only to a requirement of ‘reasonable conduct’, had an ‘equitable’ or irrevocable’ right to enter and use the shopping mall during its normal opening hours.​[29]​ It went on and stated that the shopping centre lessees had the right at any time to determine any licence the respondents may have had to enter the Centre.

Thus, the Court of Appeal held that in English law a landowner is entitled in all circumstances to exclude unwanted visitors from entry upon his/her land. Furthermore, by invoking the law of trespass or nuisance,​[30]​ a private owner can obtain declaratory and injunctive relief in support of his exclusory power. By invoking an argument of access to privately held land without a prior approval of the owner, the question of the limits of private ownership was solved by focusing on the scope of the power of exclusion from the precincts of the shopping mall.​[31]​ 

In 1997 the Court of Appeal decision was unsuccessfully challenged before the European Commission of Human Rights, the Commission’s intervention being inhibited in part by the UK’s failure to ratify the guarantee of liberty of movement contained in Protocol no 4, Article 2 of the Convention. The applicants most realistic opportunity of success being thus rendered unavailable, the Commission, by a majority, proceeded to declare inadmissible the complaint that the applicants had been deprived of freedoms of peaceful assembly an association guaranteed by the Article 11 of the Convention, adding a broad hint that the applicants’ case might have been more appropriately presented as an alleged violation of liberty of movement within the territory of a state.​[32]​

Thus, contrary to the legal development observed in Germany, Sweden, Spain or Italy, in the United Kingdom the judiciary tend to uphold proprietary rights in their absolute form.


Ad 3) The Netherlands, France, Poland and Portugal


In the Netherlands, so far courts have not experienced typical mall litigations, though they already dealt with cases where the fundamental right of freedom of expression had an impact on rights of owners of public property, ie within its vertical context. As a result, the limits on putting up political posters on public roads set by local decrees were held to be legitimate only when and to the extent to which they promote the protection of rights of others.​[33]​ Since no horizontal effect case arose, we can only theoretically assume a possible approach of Dutch courts to the issue. Given the relevant provisions of the Burgerlijk Wetboek (Civil Code),​[34]​ there is a strong probability that in a case of a clash of two rights in a private relationship, Dutch courts will acknowledge that a right in property will not always be sufficient to exclude all comers, no matter how beneficial and valuable another claim might be adjudged. This should subsequently result in a proper balancing exercise of the relative value and role of private interests as against public interest.​[35]​

Likewise, no example of the case law where horizontal effect of the human right to receive and impart information would limit absolute proprietary rights of private landowners has been found in France. Generally, rights of private owners in France are of absolute nature and the only limitation in this context seems to be a theory of abuse of rights as it results from the French case law.​[36]​ And although it is said that exclusive right conferred by the property does not reach beyond the object covered by the title of property​[37]​ (and even then, it must not be executed in an abusive way), the case law clearly shows how unwilling French courts are, when it comes to it, to restrict property owners’ rights. The marketing of the postcards displaying the owner’s barge, for example, was found as a nuisance since the barge was the dominant object in the picture.​[38]​ By analogy, French courts might well find as a reasonable ground for preventing others from using the property  the fact that the owner does not want to be associated in the eyes of his customers with, say, a political party whose representatives want to manifest their opinion and distribute political leaflets in his shopping centre.​[39]​  









C. A Strasbourg viewpoint: The way forward?


From what has already been said above it is clear that although in the most of the European jurisdictions the conceptual apparatus of property has been slowly infiltrated (or would be infiltrated if this was the case) by the idea that the owner of publicly accessible private premises may exclude members of public only on grounds which are objectively reasonable,​[41]​ English courts still hesitate to protect even those rights which are obviously political in nature, such as the right to free expression and assembly, in mixed public-private contexts.​[42]​ Whilst acknowledging that free public access to information of a political, economic and social nature and right to free assembly are essential for democracy to work,​[43]​ English courts, when it comes down to it, hesitate to touch the hallowed property rights of landowners. 

Regrettably, the ECtHR has not shed too much light on this polemic issue either. Quite the contrary, in the Appleby v United Kingdom,​[44]​ the ECtHR rejected a claim that Articles 10 and 11 gave the applicants the right to use space in a privately owned shopping mall to distribute leaflets and collect petition signatures on a public issue. The facts of the case were as follows:

Mrs Appleby and Mr Duggan set up Washington First Forum to campaign against a plan to build on the only public playing field in the vicinity of Washington town centre. In March and April 1998 they set about collecting signatures for a petition to persuade the Council to reject the project. They tried to set up a stall and canvas views in the Galleries, a shopping complex in Washington that had become the effective town centre. They were prevented from doing so, however, by Postel, the private company which had bought most of the shopping area and had, under domestic law, the power to exclude anyone conducting unauthorised activities on its land. Yet, the manager of the one of the shops in the mall gave the applicants permission to set up stands within that store. This permission, however, was not granted later on when campaigners wished to collect signatures for a further petition since the owner of the mall decided to take a strictly neutral stance on all political and religious issues. 


This case raised the important issue of the State’s positive obligations in a modern liberal society where many traditionally state-owned services like post, transport, or health have been or could be privatised. Indeed, it was claimed hat although the new town centre planned and built originally by a body set up by the government was privatised, through specific actions and decisions, the public authorities and public money were involved and there was an active presence of public agencies in the vicinity. Furthermore, several important public services, such as public library or the police station were located in or near to the centre. As a result, it was claimed that the public authorities had to bear also some responsibility for decisions about the nature of the area and access to and use of it. 

Nevertheless, the ECtHR found no breach of the positive obligation under the Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR by the UK Government.​[45]​ Acknowledging the importance of freedom of expression for the democracy to work, the ECtHR held that the Article 10 did not bestow any freedom of forum for the exercise of that right.​[46]​ The restriction on the applicants’ ability to communicate their views was limited to the entrance areas and passageways of the shopping mall and did not prevent then from obtaining individual permission for a stand within it or from distributing their leaflets on the public assess paths in the area. It also remained open to them to campaign in the old town centre and to employ alternative means, such as calling door-to-door or seeking exposure in the local press, radio and television.​[47]​ 

The majority failed, however, to convince a judge Maruste, who was not able to share the finding of the majority of the Chamber that the applicants’ rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR were not infringed.  He took into account factors such as the kinds of enterprise in the mall, the kind of issue that was being debated as well as the history of the development of the mall and came to the conclusion that the property rights of the shopping mall owners were unnecessarily given priority over the applicants’ freedom of expression and assembly. From his point of view, the old traditional rule that a private landowner retains its inalienable right to exclude all comers even where there are clear consequences in the public sphere was no longer fully adaptable to contemporary conditions and society. According to Judge the response to this ‘mall’ problem should have been to move from the absolutist ‘Englishman’s home is a castle’ position towards the reasonable and justifiable access test. ​[48]​ 
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